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Amanda Harris
Abstract
After Crawford v. Washington opened the door to a Confrontation
Clause debate in 2004, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently confronted confrontation issues arising out of the Crawford
interpretation. One issue that the Supreme Court has not yet tackled is
whether the Confrontation Clause applies during non-capital and capital
sentencing. While many states and federal courts continue to hold that
no right of confrontation during sentencing exists, many other courts
have chosen to apply a right of confrontation in both capital and noncapital sentencing. This Note takes two new approaches to the
Confrontation Clause at sentencing debate. First, this Note addresses
both the text of the Sixth Amendment and the history surrounding the
Confrontation Clause to conclude that the right of confrontation should
apply during sentencing, or at least during capital sentencing. Second,
this Note rejects the rationale that Williams v. New York is the
controlling precedent in the confrontation at sentencing debate. Under
this approach, applying the Confrontation Clause at sentencing may be
the next logical step in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
The scene in a London courtroom on April 17, 1554, had all the
underpinnings of a modern Hollywood drama. Nicholas Throckmorton
was on trial and charged with ―compassing and imagining the death of
the Queen, levying war against the Queen within the
realm . . . intending to depose the Queen of her Royal estate, and so to
destroy her, falsely and traitorously desiring and concluding to take the
Tower of London.‖1 If being accused of ―intending to depose the
Queen‖ was not bad enough, multiple ―wrangle[s] ensued between the
Bench and the prisoner,‖2 and the defendant was forced to ―call[] upon
1. J.W. WILLIS BUND, A SELECTION OF CASES FROM THE STATE TRIALS 157 (1879).
2. Id.
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the Crown to prove it[s]‖3 case. The Crown‘s case relied largely on
several conspirators‘ confessions.4 At one point, Throckmorton objected
to the read confessions and said, ―Master Crofts [another confessor] is
yet living, and is here this day. How happeneth it he is not brought face
to face to justify this matter, neither hath been of all this time?‖5 This
demand for confrontation was denied.6 To make matters worse for poor
Throckmorton (or not so poor if he was actually trying to overthrow the
Queen), the jury‘s not guilty verdict was tossed out and the jurors were
themselves thrown into prison.7 While Throckmorton‘s trial was not the
picture of modern justice, it showcases an idea that dates back to Roman
times.8 Throckmorton‘s case, and the more notorious Sir Walter
Raleigh9 case, are both examples of an inherent desire of the accused to
confront witnesses against them.10
Notably, Throckmorton did not have the ability to confront his
accusers, and ―[t]o be sure, the norm of confrontation was not always
respected.‖11 While one scholar may have gone a bit far by insisting
that, ―the right of confrontation is an American innovation, not an
import from England,‖12 the origins of confrontation, and what exactly
confrontation means, are still heavily debated. Whatever one‘s view on
the origins of the right of confrontation, or whether confrontation should
even be a fundamental procedural right at all, the history of the
Confrontation Clause must guide one‘s understanding of the Clause‘s
meaning and scope. Why? The answer is simple: because the Supreme
Court said so.13
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Crawford v. Washington14 spoke
clearly; the ―Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the
reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state
courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising.‖15 The
3. Id. at 158.
4. Id. at 158–59.
5. NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON, THE TRIAL OF NICHOLAS THROCKMORTON 39 (Annabel
Patterson ed., 1998).
6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
7. WILLIS BUND, supra note 1, at 161.
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
9. See WILLIS BUND, supra note 1, at 345.
10. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
11. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1204 (2002).
12. Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 209, 220 (2005).
13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (―We must therefore turn to the historical background of the
Clause to understand its meaning.‖).
14. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
15. Id. at 67. Thus, the Court overruled the Ohio v. Roberts precedent of the ―reliability‖
standard. Id.; see also discussion infra Section I.C.
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Crawford holding opened a Pandora‘s Box of questions; among them is
whether this procedural right and historical view of the Confrontation
Clause apply during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial. The Court
has never squarely addressed whether sentencing is included as part of
―all criminal prosecutions‖ in the text of the Sixth Amendment.16
Because the Court determined that when it comes to confrontation, a
historical right and not just reliability is at stake,17 Part I of this Note
takes a journey through a historical analysis of the Confrontation
Clause, as well as a brief history of the unified trial and sentencing
concept, which was common at the time the Constitution was drafted.
Part I will also briefly address the textual analysis of Crawford and
other Supreme Court post-Crawford decisions. Part II will investigate
why some state courts have ruled that the Confrontation Clause applies
during non-capital sentencing, while all federal courts facing the same
issue have held the opposite. Part III explores the view of some courts
that death is different, and thus, the Confrontation Clause applies during
capital sentencing only. In Part IV, two original ideas are explored.
First, by taking a textual outlook within a historical framework, Part IV
seeks to textually answer the question What Would the Framers Do?.
Second, Part IV also questions the precedent of Williams v. New York18
in determining whether the Confrontation Clause applies during
sentencing. Finally, the Conclusion combines history, the text of the
Confrontation Clause, and the nature of sentencing proceedings to
conclude that the right of confrontation should exist at sentencing, or at
the very least during capital sentencing.
I. WWFD? WHAT WOULD THE FRAMERS DO?
A. An Unclear View of Confrontation Clause History
―I told them that it is not the Roman custom to hand over any man
before he has faced his accusers and has had an opportunity to defend
himself against their charges.‖19
The Confrontation Clause may not be as attention grabbing (at least
pre-Crawford) as its more well-known counterparts in the Sixth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights in general, but its late bloomer status is rather
16. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1969 (2005).
17. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 (―We do not read the historical sources to say that a prior
opportunity to cross-examine was merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for
admissibility . . . .‖); id. at 61 (The Confrontation Clause ―commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.‖).
18. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
19. Acts 25:16 (New International Version).
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deceiving. The Crawford decision restored debate to the formerly
hibernating Confrontation Clause,20 whose interpretation had remained
unchanged for nearly twenty-five years.21 In relevant part, the Sixth
Amendment states simply, ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.‖22 To be sure, this is a long way from early English courts where
treason defendants often demanded that their accusers be brought to
them ―face to face,‖ but only sometimes enjoyed such a luxury.23
Confrontation gained some traction in Tudor England, and by the
middle of the seventeenth century, English courts regularly ―required
that treason witnesses testify before the accused and be subjected to
questioning by him.‖24 As previously noted, the most notorious case
concerning the right of confrontation is that of Sir Walter Raleigh, in
which Raleigh demanded, ―the Proof of the Common Law is by witness
and jury: let Cobham [Raleigh‘s accuser] be here, let him speak it. Call
my accuser before my face . . . .‖25 While it is true, as one scholar
humorously suggested, that Sir Walter Raleigh did not come over on the
Mayflower,26 it does appear that early Americans embraced this
Raleigh-like right of confrontation.27
As early as 1647, Massachusetts provided protection for the
criminally accused with a statute that stated, ―[I]n all capital cases all
witnesses shall be present wheresover they dwell.‖28 Scholars Richard
D. Friedman and Bridget McCormack attribute a more rapid
development of the right of confrontation in early America than in
English Courts partly to the American ―adversarial spirit,‖ which
created a necessity of such a protection in the American system.29 The
scholars also emphasize the growing importance of confrontation in the
Revolutionary period, during which many states began including the
right of confrontation in state constitutions using both the historical
―face to face‖ language, as well as language more closely mirroring that
of the later-to-come Sixth Amendment.30
20. John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Crime Labs and Prison Guards: A Comment on
Melendez-Diaz and its Potential Impact on Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 3 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 205, 206 (2009).
21. Id. at 210.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1205.
24. Id.
25. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
26. Graham, supra note 12, at 209.
27. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1206.
28. Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, this statute may support the viewpoint of some
courts that death is different. See discussion infra Part III.
29. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1206.
30. Id.
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In today‘s world some scholars insist that the Framers created the
Sixth Amendment ―holistically‖31 or as a ―unified‖32 set of rights, and
all the rights flowing from the Sixth Amendment must apply at all
stages of the trial.33 Other scholars view the Confrontation Clause
independently as a procedural right within a trial, discussing it
separately from other trial rights.34 As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in
Crawford, Abraham Holmes at the Massachusetts ratifying convention
feared that in the absence of a confrontation clause, trials would become
―little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain . . . the
Inquisition.‖35 Holmes‘s concern was alleviated when Congress
included the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment.36 Much
later the Court also held that the right of confrontation extends to state
prosecutions via the Fourteenth Amendment.37
B. Drawing a Proverbial Line in the Sand: Unitary Capital Trials and
the Unforeseen Problem Arising from Bifurcation in Trials
―The question of guilt and the question of death both were decided in a
single jury verdict at the end of a single proceeding conducted as an
adversarial trial.‖38
One of the biggest challenges of viewing the Confrontation Clause
in its historical context is trying to determine what the Framers would
have done in the sentencing framework that exists today. While the
modern bifurcated framework39 did not exist during the Framers‘ time,40
31. Graham, supra note 12, at 210.
32. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 2008 (―This unified theory of Sixth Amendment rights
flows naturally from the constitutional text, which grants those rights without distinction ‗in all
criminal prosecutions.‘‖).
33. See id. at Part III. In Part III of Professor Douglass‘s article, Confronting Death: Sixth
Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, he argues that ―Sixth Amendment rights support each
other.‖ Id. at 2010. He insists that the right to counsel, the right of cross-examination, the right
to a speedy public trial by a jury, and all rights flowing from the Sixth Amendment must apply
together because the text of the Constitution supports a unified theory of rights. Id. at 2008–10.
Douglass makes a textual argument that capital sentencing is part of ―all criminal prosecutions.‖
Id. at 2008. Further, since the text of the Sixth Amendment is drafted as one sentence, each right
is necessary in ―all criminal prosecutions,‖ and thus, all Sixth Amendment rights must apply. Id.
34. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 48–49 (2004).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 49.
37. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (―[T]he Sixth Amendment‘s right of an
accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made
obligatory on the States . . . .‖). Notably, states later interpreting the right of confrontation at
sentencing have chosen to interpret the federal Constitution, despite having similarly drafted
protections in their own state confrontation clauses. See State v. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d 82, 87–88
(N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
38. Douglass, supra note 16, at 1972.
39. Bifurcation, the separation of the guilt and penalty phase of a trial, became popular
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one must still ―turn to the historical background.‖41 At the time the
Sixth Amendment was drafted, unitary capital trials, where a jury
determined both guilt and death with a single verdict, were standard.42
As John G. Douglass notes in his article Confronting Death: Sixth
Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, ―[t]he Framers lived in a
system of capital litigation where a unitary trial and a single jury verdict
determined not only guilt or innocence, but life or death as well.‖43
With this in mind, it is easy to understand Douglass‘s theory that the
Framers crafted a set of rights through the Sixth Amendment to govern
all proceedings ―in all criminal prosecutions.‖44
This history still begs the question, how could the Framers have
drafted a clause that addresses a bifurcated trial system that did not
become widespread until the mid-1970s,45 nearly two hundred years
after the drafting of the Constitution? The reality, of course, is that the
Framers could not have foreseen this bifurcated system, but the inquiry
cannot stop there. History shows a few important and relevant
observations that may shed some light on WWFD, What Would the
Framers Do?. First, early American criminal law ―was dominated by
mandatory penalties, not by discretionary sentencing.‖46 Second, the
Framers were concerned with confrontation, not hearsay, when they
drafted the Sixth Amendment because the hearsay doctrine and
evidentiary law were not well developed during the Framers‘ time.47
Third, the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment in the absence of any
thoughts of separate ―trial rights‖ and ―sentencing rights‖ because such
separation simply did not exist.48 Fourth, a guilty verdict for a capital
offense, at the time of the Framers, was usually a death sentence.49
Thus, with such a historical narrative in mind, the question is
simply: Is the bifurcated trial setting where ―trial rights‖ and
―sentencing rights‖ are divided, simply a proverbial line that courts have
drawn in the sand? Of course, this is not to say that bifurcation is bad or
after the rise of public opposition to the death penalty and the evolution of the modern prison
system. Id. at 1972–73.
40. Id. at 1972.
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
42. Douglass, supra note 16, at 1972.
43. Id. at 2008.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 1973. There was also a shift during the nineteenth century from mandatory
sentencing towards a more flexible sentencing range. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 481 (2000).
46. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 (―The substantive criminal law tended to be sanctionspecific; it prescribed a particular sentence for each offense. The judge was meant simply to
impose that sentence . . . .‖); Douglass, supra note 16, at 1977.
47. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 11, at 1208.
48. Douglass, supra note 16, at 2011.
49. Id.
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unconstitutional; it simply creates an issue unknown to, and
unaddressed by, the Framers. The answer may turn on whether one
believes that the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment simply ―to
protect the innocent from punishment‖50 or whether the Framers also
thought the Sixth Amendment protects ―the guilty from undeserved
death,‖51 or even, the guilty from undeserved excessive punishment.
The answer may also depend on whether or not one believes the
sentencing phase of a trial is part of ―all criminal prosecutions‖ 52 under
the Sixth Amendment.
Finally, the varying sentencing frameworks across jurisdictions
throws another proverbial wrench into determining an answer to
WWFD?. Non-capital jury sentencing procedures vary; some
jurisdictions require bifurcated proceedings, others do not.53
Importantly, states also differ on what type of information, including
prior offenses, may be introduced during sentencing; in fact, the desire
to allow prosecutors to introduce evidence about a defendant‘s prior
criminal history is a large reason bifurcated proceedings were adopted
by the states.54 In general, ―[e]ach state‘s jury sentencing law and
practice has developed its own individual characteristics, shaped by the
unique legal and political skeleton that supports it.‖55 On the other hand,
federal death penalty statutes require bifurcated ―guilt and penalty
determinations.‖56 Further, while all states use some form of bifurcation
in capital proceedings,57 others divide capital sentencing into trifurcated
proceedings, including: the guilt phase, the capital-eligibility phase, and
the ―balancing‖ or penalty phase where the judge or jury determines a
sentence.58 With such differing frameworks, it is difficult to generalize
sentencing issues, but for purposes of this Note, the discussion is
predominately limited to discussing noncapital and capital sentencing in
a general sense.

50. Id. at 2028.
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
53. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A ThreeState Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 891 (2004).
54. Id. at 892.
55. Id.
56. Margo A. Rocklin, Place the Death Penalty on a Tripod, or Make it Stand on Its Own
Two Feet?, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 788, 789 (2007).
57. Id. at 789–90.
58. See, e.g., Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2002). See generally Rocklin,
supra note 56, at 792–93.
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C. Confronting Crawford and Its Offspring
―Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment‘s protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
‗reliability.‘‖59
Courts have described the decision in Crawford v. Washington as ―a
‗bombshell,‘ a ‗renaissance,‘ and a ‗newly shaped lens‘ through which
to view the Confrontation Clause.‖60 Thunderstruck as the legal
community remains six years later, it is worth pausing briefly to
understand the textual interpretation of the Sixth Amendment from
Crawford and the way that definition has been applied in later Supreme
Court confrontation cases.
To begin, one must first understand the decision that controlled
courts for twenty-five years, Ohio v. Roberts.61 In Roberts, the Court
held that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to allow the
defendant to test adverse evidence, and developed a two-prong test in
which the prosecutor could bring evidence before a jury by showing
both unavailability of the witness and that the evidence bore ―indicia of
reliability.‖62 Further, the Roberts Court reiterated its view that hearsay
evidentiary rules and the Confrontation Clause were designed to protect
―‗similar values.‘‖63 Because reliability could be ―inferred‖ when
evidence fell ―within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,‖64 the Roberts
standard became a per se rule that all but eliminated a defendant‘s
separate right of confrontation.65
Twenty-five years later in Crawford‘s trial for assault and attempted
murder,66 the prosecution played tape-recorded statements made by
Crawford‘s wife to the police.67 Crawford‘s wife was unavailable to
testify because Washington marital privilege law prohibited a spouse
from testifying without the other spouse‘s consent.68 Because
Crawford‘s wife was unable to testify, Crawford was unable to cross59. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
60. Blume & Paavola, supra note 20, at 206.
61. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
62. To meet the two-prong test: first, the prosecutor must show the declarant is
unavailable and, second, the statements must ―bear[ ] adequate ‗indicia of reliability‘‖ (by being
either a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ or by bearing ―particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness‖). Id. at 66.
63. Id. at 66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1969)).
64. Id.
65. Valerie J. Silverman, Testing the Testimonial Doctrine: The Impact of Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts on State-Level Criminal Prosecutions and Procedure, 91 B.U. L. REV. 789,
795 (2011).
66. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004).
67. Id. at 38.
68. Id. at 40.
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examine her at trial.69 On appeal, the Supreme Court shocked the legal
world by holding that the State unconstitutionally admitted testimonial
statements by Crawford‘s wife.70
At its core, Crawford overturned Ohio v. Roberts, and held that the
Confrontation Clause bars testimonial statements of witnesses who do
not appear at trial, unless that witness is unavailable and the defendant
has been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.71 Central to
this decision was that the Sixth Amendment, ―commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.‖72 Thus, the
Confrontation Clause under Crawford is inherently inflexible.
Reliability must be achieved in a particular manner, and that manner is
cross-examination.73 Importantly, this right to confrontation ―is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.‖74 Crawford was a
profound shift from the ―indicia of reliability‖ standard created in
Roberts.75
Justice Scalia arrived at this holding through a similar historical
analysis as reviewed briefly in Section I.A.,76 but he also went a step
further by focusing on the text of the Confrontation Clause.77 First, from
an 1828 dictionary, Justice Scalia defined a ―witness‖ as one who
―bears testimony.‖78 Further, ―‗[t]estimony,‘ in turn, is typically ‗[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact.‘‖79 Thus, text, history, and the original meaning
of the plain language in the Confrontation Clause are all essential to the
Crawford holding. Importantly, absent, and often outright rejected, in
the Crawford rationale are words like practicality,80 hearsay,81
substantive reliability,82 and balancing tests.83 Justice Scalia was
69. Id. at 38.
70. Id. at 68.
71. Id. at 53–54, 68.
72. Id. at 61.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Charles Short, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in
Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 177, 197 (2009) (―In Crawford, the Supreme Court
moved away from these rationales of reliability and accuracy.‖).
76. See discussion supra Section I.A.
77. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–69.
78. Id. at 51 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828)).
79. Id. (second alteration in original).
80. The word practicality never appears in the Crawford opinion. See generally Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
81. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (Justice Scalia actually rejects the hearsay argument by
noting, ―[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment‘s core concerns.‖).
82. Crawford also notes that while reliability is the ultimate goal of the Confrontation
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emphatic about ridding the Confrontation Clause of vague standards,
which provided judges with too much discretion.84 Even ―run-of-themill assault prosecutions‖ like Crawford require confrontation.85
The Court‘s post-Crawford decisions largely addressed the issue of
which types of statements are ―testimonial‖ within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause. In Davis v. Washington,86 the Court determined
that ―[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.‖87 In contrast, statements are testimonial
when, considering the circumstances objectively, there is no ongoing
emergency, and ―the primary purpose of interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖88
Importantly, crime lab reports that were at issue in another postCrawford case, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,89 also seem to fit this
past–present distinction90 because the crime lab reports at issue were
sworn affidavits that were completed after the crime to prove past
events.91 The Court held that an analyst is both a witness for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment92 and also a person who provides testimony
against a defendant,93 as required by the text of the Sixth Amendment.
Justice Scalia reasoned that the Confrontation Clause ―contemplates two
classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and those in his favor.
The prosecution must produce the former, the defendant may call the
latter . . . [t]here is not a third category of witness, helpful to the
prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.‖94
Thus Crawford and its offspring interpret the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation rigidly. ―Where testimonial statements are at
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation.‖95 Importantly, reliability for reliability‘s sake is no
Clause, it is ―a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.‖ Id. at 61.
83. Id. at 67–68 (―[B]y replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended
balancing tests, we do violence to their design.‖).
84. Id. at 68.
85. Id.
86. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
87. Id. at 822.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
90. Blume & Paavola, supra note 20, at 228.
91. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2535.
92. Id. at 2532.
93. Id. at 2533.
94. Id. at 2534.
95. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
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longer the requirement of the Confrontation Clause. Instead, when
asking WWFD?, Crawford explains that the Framers prescribed a means
of achieving reliability, not a substantive guarantee of reliability itself.96
II. TO APPLY OR NOT TO APPLY THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AT
SENTENCING, THAT IS THE QUESTION
Most scholarship on the subject of the right of confrontation at
sentencing has been devoted to federal district and circuit court rulings
discussing whether the right of confrontation applies during capital
sentencing.97 What may be missing is some insight into why, despite
every federal court addressing the issue holding otherwise, some state
courts have applied the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation to
noncapital sentencing. Since the Confrontation Clause applies equally to
the states, it is only fair to look at what they have to say. Tougher yet
may be reconciling recent Court definitions and interpretations of the
Confrontation Clause and earlier Court decisions, like the heavily
debated case of Williams v. New York.98 Thus, when it comes to the
right of confrontation at sentencing, to apply or not to apply, that is the
question.
A. Choosing to Apply: A Modern Trend among the States?
―[W]e are convinced that the right of confrontation, guaranteed
by . . . the Sixth Amendment . . . extends to Appellant‘s sentencing
proceeding before a jury.‖99
1. Vankirk v. State
The most recent court to tackle the issue of whether the right of
confrontation applies during sentencing is the Arkansas Supreme Court
in a 2011 case, Vankirk v. State.100 In Vankirk, the defendant pleaded
guilty to three counts of rape, but chose to have a jury sentence him in a
bifurcated proceeding.101 During sentencing, the judge permitted the
State to introduce a videotaped interview of a police investigator
questioning the victim about the rape allegations; the victim did not
appear at sentencing.102 On appeal, the court reasoned that in Arkansas,
trials are divided in ―separate and distinct stages,‖103 that is guilt and
sentencing. Thus, at least in Arkansas, sentencing is ―in essence, a trial
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 61.
See discussion infra Part III.
337 U.S. 241 (1949).
Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, *10 (2011).
Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428 (2011).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *6 (quoting Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 412 (1994)).
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in and of itself, in which new evidence may be submitted.‖104 While the
court did not make an outright textual rationale, its findings are
consistent with the text of the Sixth Amendment because the court
reasoned that sentencing is essentially another trial and a defendant‘s
rights must still apply.105 Thus, sentencing in this context is a part of
―all criminal prosecutions‖ in which the defendant maintains a right ―to
confront the witnesses against him‖ as guaranteed by the text of the
Sixth Amendment.106
The Vankirk court sided with a capital sentencing case, United
States v. Mills,107 and emphasized, ―[W]e agree with the Mills court that
a sentencing body‘s need for the admission of more evidence ‗does not
sanction the admission of unconstitutional evidence against the
defendant.‘‖108 Further, the Vankirk court reasoned that the weighty
decisions made during the sentencing phase make the right of
confrontation even more crucial and noted, ―Given the gravity of the
decision to be made at the penalty phase, the [government] is not
relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional
guarantees.‖109 The Vankirk court also noted that applying the right to
confrontation during sentencing was consistent with applying other
rights during sentencing, including the rules of evidence, discovery, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the right to speedy sentencing,
all of which apply in Arkansas sentencing.110 Finally, the court in
Vankirk also rejected the idea that Williams v. New York, a 1949
Supreme Court case,111 controls whether there is a right to confrontation
at sentencing.112 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court broke away from a
large number of courts that have used Williams as at least partial
justification for refusing to apply the right of confrontation during
sentencing.113
104. Id. at *7 (quoting Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 413 (1994)).
105. Id. at *10.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
107. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
108. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *9 (quoting Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d. 1115, 1130 (C.D. Cal.
2006)).
109. Id. (quoting United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
110. Id. at *10. This opinion is consistent with the idea that Sixth Amendment rights are a
unitary set of rights, which cannot be divided. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
111. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
112. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *7.
113. Cases that cite Williams as at least partial justification for not applying the right of
confrontation during sentencing include: United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046, 1048 (8th
Cir. 2005), United States. v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618–19 (7th Cir. 2005), Szabo v. Walls, 313
F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2002), United States v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Iowa
2005), State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 941 (Ariz. 2006), People v. Banks, 934 N.E.2d 435, 461
(2010).
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In Williams, a jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder and
recommended life in prison, but the trial judge imposed a death
sentence based on evidence from trial as well as other pre-sentencing
information, including evidence of other crimes where the defendant
was considered a perpetrator but never was convicted.114 Notably, under
New York law the judge could consider information ―obtained outside
the courtroom from persons whom a defendant has not been permitted
to confront or cross-examine.‖115 The Supreme Court held that Williams
had not been denied due process of law, and reasoned that sentencing
judges in early America, as well as in England, always exercised wide
discretion in determining the sources and types of evidence to consider
when administering punishment under law.116
The court in Vankirk rejected the application of Williams to the issue
of confrontation during sentencing for four reasons.117 First, the
Williams Court decided the case based on the Due Process Clause, not
the Confrontation Clause.118 Second, the Supreme Court considered the
Williams case more than fifteen years prior to Pointer v. Texas, which
applied the Confrontation Clause to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment.119 Third, the Arkansas court made an interesting, albeit
brief, distinction between judge and jury decisions, holding that the
Confrontation Clause applies in jury sentencing.120 The distinction
between judge and jury is consistent with the Vankirk court‘s refusal to
deem the Williams decision controlling121 because the Williams decision
was originally decided, according New York statute, by a trial judge,
not a jury.122 Finally, the Vankirk court made another distinction
between the modern proceedings and those in Williams by indicating
that a bifurcated jury sentencing may be more like a criminal
prosecution,123 or at least a ―separate proceeding,‖ making the right of

114. Williams, 337 U.S. at 242, 244.
115. Id. at 245.
116. Id. at 246, 252.
117. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *8.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *8, 10. It is unclear what the Arkansas Supreme Court would have held had a
judge sentenced the case.
121. Id. at *8 (―Moreover, the issue as framed in Williams differs significantly from the one
presented to us today in that Williams involved a judge and what information he could consider
in sentencing, whereas, here, there was a jury impaneled to weigh evidence and impose
punishment.‖).
122. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949) (―Under New York statutes a
state judge cannot escape his grave responsibility of fixing sentence.‖).
123. Vankirk, 2011 Ark. at *6 (―Thus, it is obvious that this new procedure [of bifurcation]
differs considerably from the prior conduct of trials where the jury assessed both guilt and
sentence during one proceeding.‖ (quoting Hill v. State, 887 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1994))).
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confrontation necessary.124 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court not only
held, but was ―convinced that the right of confrontation . . . extends to
Appellant‘s sentencing proceeding before a jury.‖125
2. State v. Rodriguez
Another court choosing to apply the Confrontation Clause at
sentencing was the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v.
Rodriguez.126 In Rodriguez, the defendant pleaded guilty to several
drug-related offenses, but during his jury sentencing, the district court
refused to apply the Confrontation Clause.127 The Minnesota Supreme
Court overturned this decision and held that the Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation applies during jury sentencing trials.128 The Rodriguez
court based its decision largely on the Supreme Court‘s emphasis on the
―fundamental and historical importance‖ of the right of crossexamination and the right to a trial by jury.129 The Rodriguez court
pointed to three Supreme Court cases that guided its decision, Apprendi
v. New Jersey,130 Blakely v. Washington,131 and, of course, Crawford v.
Washington.132
In Apprendi, the Court held a New Jersey statute that allowed for
upward sentencing was unconstitutional133 because a ―trial by jury has
been understood to require that ‗the truth of every accusation, whether
preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should
afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the
defendant‘s] equals and neighbours . . . .‘‖134 Next, in Blakely, the Court
reemphasized its decision in Apprendi, and reversed a Washington
court‘s decision to give the defendant upward sentencing because the
upward decision was based on facts not admitted by the defendant or
124. Id. at *10.
125. Id. Notably in Apprendi, the Court acknowledged that judges maintain discretion in
individual cases, but recognized a limitation on the judge‘s discretion. Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 482 (2000). In dicta, the Court also noted that the Court in Williams ―held that the
Constitution does not restrict a judge‘s sentencing decision to information that is charged in an
indictment and subject to cross-examination in open court.‖ Id. at 546. From that sentence, it is
unclear as to whether the Court equates the right to cross-examine a witness with the right of
confrontation, and whether that observation is limited within the due process challenge or within
the Sixth Amendment context as well.
126. 754 N.W.2d 672, 680 (Minn. 2008).
127. Id. at 675.
128. Id. at 681.
129. Id.
130. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
131. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
132. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d at 678.
133. Id.
134. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)).
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found by a jury.135 Finally, as previously discussed, the Court in
Crawford held that the right of confrontation bars all testimonial
statements offered against a defendant, unless the witness is unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.136 Taken together, the Rodriguez court interpreted the three
cases to ―establish not only that the facts on which certain sentence
enhancements are based must be found by a jury, but also that the right
of cross-examination guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is a core
component of the right to a jury trial.‖137 Ultimately, the court also
concluded that the right of confrontation is a ―core component‖ of a jury
trial; since jury sentencing is essentially a trial, the right of
confrontation must apply.138
3. State v. Hurt
An interesting twist in the confrontation puzzle came in State v.
Hurt,139 a 2010 North Carolina Court of Appeals case, where the court
also chose to apply the Confrontation Clause during sentencing.140
However, unlike the Vankirk and Rodriguez courts, the Hurt court chose
to place a qualification on the right to confrontation; that is, the court
determined that the right to confrontation ―applies to all sentencing
proceedings where a jury makes the determination of a fact or facts that,
if found, increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory
maximum.‖141 Markedly, the Hurt court chose to interpret the United
States Constitution, despite having a similar state confrontation
clause.142 While the court acknowledged that the vast majority of other
state and federal courts have chosen not to interpret the Confrontation
Clause as applicable to sentencing, the Hurt court made clear that ―the
issue is far from outright settled.‖143
The North Carolina Supreme Court had already applied the right of
confrontation at capital sentencing.144 However, the same North
Carolina Court of Appeals that decided Hurt had previously declined to
extend that right to noncapital sentencing.145 The Hurt court chose to
135. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d at 679.
136. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004); see supra Section I.C.
137. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d at 678.
138. See id. at 680–81.
139. 702 S.E.2d 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
140. Id. at 87.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 89; see also State v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 115–16 (N.C. 2004) (relying on
Crawford v. Washington to hold that the Confrontation Clause applies in capital sentencing).
145. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d at 89 (noting that ―our holding [in State v. Sings] cannot be read to
encompass the facts of this case, where the factor potentially augmenting Defendant‘s sentence
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make a distinction between a sentencing jury deciding facts impacting
Hurt‘s sentence, and their previous ruling that did not include jury
sentencing.146 Like the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned in
Rodriguez, the Hurt court provided that the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Blakely,147Apprendi, and Booker ―[have] eroded any notion of
a clear line separating trial from sentencing and distinguishing the
procedural rights that must be afforded defendants at each phase.‖148
The Hurt court also acknowledged that other ―courts have clung
steadfastly to Williams,‖ but refused to deem it controlling since no
North Carolina appellate court has cited to Williams after the Court‘s
decision in Crawford.149 Moreover, the Hurt court determined that since
aggravating factors warrant a jury determination beyond a reasonable
doubt as required by Blakely (at least in North Carolina), then ―the same
Confrontation Clause protections that are guaranteed at the guilt–
innocence phase of trial also apply to evidence presented at sentencing
hearing‖ under the same circumstances.150
Despite the uncertainty and even lack of real uniformity among the
rationales of the to apply side of the confrontation at sentencing debate,
one thing is clear: ―Crawford v. Washington . . . has breathed new life
into the debate.‖151 Moreover, one question has gone unanswered by the
final arbiters of the Constitution and that is, ―whether sentencings are
‗criminal prosecutions‘ for Sixth Amendment purposes.‖152

was determined by a jury‖); State v. Sings, 641 S.E.2d 370, 372 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (―[W]e
see no basis for extending [the ruling of State v. Bell] to noncapital sentencing hearings.‖).
146. Hurt, 702 S.E. 2d at 89.
147. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (―[T]he relevant ‗statutory
maximum‘ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but
the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.‖).
148. Hurt, 702 S.E.2d at 91.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 93.
151. United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing because post-Booker sentencing guidelines
are no longer mandatory and confrontation procedural protections are thus unnecessary at
sentencing).
152. Id. at 725.
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B. To Not Apply: Following the Status Quo?
―Leaving Crawford‘s Confrontation Clause rule where it is found‖153
1. State v. McGill: A State Outlook
Not every state court154 has embraced the Arkansas and Minnesota
courts‘ interpretation of the right of confrontation during sentencing or
more specifically, the courts‘ interpretations of Williams.155 In fact,
many courts have based much of their decision not to extend the right to
confrontation to sentencing (and capital sentencing) on Williams.156 In
State v. McGill, for example, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on
Williams to hold that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at
sentencing generally, or capital sentencing more specifically.157 In fact,
the McGill court read the Williams decision quite broadly, outright
stating that the Williams Court ―held that the right [of confrontation]
does not apply to sentencing proceedings.‖158 However, notably, the
Williams decision did not base its decision on the Confrontation Clause
at all.159
The McGill court also reasoned that the Williams decision was
based on a historical analysis, similar to that in Crawford.160 It is true
that both Williams and Crawford took a historical approach, but looking
at Williams and Crawford side by side, it is difficult to reconcile each
version of history. In Williams, the Court reasoned, ―[B]oth before and
since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and
in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could
exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used.‖161
Further, the Williams Court even recognized that ―[l]eaving a
sentencing judge free to avail himself of out-of-court information in
153. United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 2009).
154. And no federal court that has decided the issue of the applicability of the
Confrontation Clause in noncapital sentencing cases has applied the Confrontation Clause. See
infra note 187.
155. See State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 941 (Ariz. 2006); see also People v. Banks, 934
N.E.2d 435, 461 (Ill. 2010).
156. See discussion infra Part III.
157. McGill, 140 P.3d at 941.
158. Id. Ironically this interpretation of Williams v. New York seems illogical. As Justice
Hurwitz noted in his dissent in State v. McGill, ―Williams was not a Confrontation Clause case.
Indeed, under the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence in 1949 it could not have been; the Court did
not hold the Confrontation Clause applicable to the States until sixteen years later . . . .‖ Id. at
948 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
159. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (―We cannot say that the dueprocess clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge gets additional out-of-court
information to assist him in the exercise of this awesome power of imposing the death
sentence.‖).
160. McGill, 140 P.3d at 941.
161. Williams, 337 U.S. at 246.
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making such a fateful choice of sentences does secure to him a broad
discretionary power, one susceptible of abuse.‖162
However, this is the very type of discretion that Justice Scalia, in
Crawford, said the Framers wanted to avoid. In Crawford, Justice Scalia
reasoned that the Framers ―knew that judges . . . could not always be
trusted to safeguard the rights of the people.‖163 In fact, the Framers
―were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.‖164 Justice
Scalia insisted that the danger of British judges‘ discretion was a recent
memory to the Framers, and thus, the Confrontation Clause was drafted
as a ―categorical constitutional guarantee.‖165 Notably, the type of
judicial discretion that Justice Scalia and the Framers were concerned
about limiting was discretion concerning a defendant‘s constitutional
rights, not his evidentiary or other protections.166 Thus, the courts
disagree not just about whether Williams applies in the case of
sentencing and confrontation rights, but the courts may disagree more
fundamentally about the holding and the historical approach in
Williams.167
The McGill court gave three additional reasons for refusing to apply
the Confrontation Clause during sentencing.168 First, the court
concluded that the penalty phase is not ―a criminal prosecution.‖169
Second, ―historical practices support the use of out-of-court statements
in sentencing.‖170 Lastly, the sentencing body needs a complete set of
information to determine sentencing.171 While the court gave these
reasons, it provided little elaboration on those points, except as to
162. Id. at 251.
163. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2005).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. To be fair, however, the Court in Crawford addressed the right to confrontation during
the course of a trial, not at sentencing specifically. The Crawford Court was ultimately
concerned with constraining the judicial discretion that had run rampant under the Roberts
standard, which allowed judges to determine which kind of statement was subject to the
Confrontation Clause. Id. However, it is quite unclear how the Court would rule about judicial
discretion during regular or capital sentencing. One thing is clear: the Crawford Court was
emphatic that for testimonial statements, confrontation is required. Id. at 68–69. Notably, the
evidence admitted during the sentencing phase of trials is very often of the ―testimonial‖ nature
that Crawford and Melendez-Diaz outright prohibited (for instance, the testimony of inmates,
parole officers, prison workers, or social workers). See Rocklin, supra note 56, at 806–07;
Blume & Paavola, supra note 20, at 224–27.
168. State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (Ariz. 2006).
169. Id. The court, however, provides no historical definition or rationale as to why the
penalty phase of sentencing is not a ―criminal prosecution.‖ Thus, the court correctly points to
textualism and history, but provides no history or textual argument to support its broad
conclusions.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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reason that there is long-standing precedent.172
2. United We Stand: Federal Courts and the Refusal to Apply the
Confrontation Clause at Noncapital Sentencing
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also
refused to apply the Confrontation Clause during the sentencing phase
because ―witnesses providing information to the court after guilt is
established are not accusers within the meaning of the confrontation
clause.‖173 In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on Williams
and concluded that, ―the relevant provision at sentencing is the due
process clause [sic], not the confrontation clause [sic].‖174 However, this
reasoning may be difficult to reconcile with the Court‘s more recent
rationale in Melendez-Diaz, which concluded that the Constitution only
contemplates two types of witnesses, those against the defendant and
those in favor.175
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also
examined the issue, and refused to apply the Confrontation Clause
during sentencing, at least in part, because ―[a]s long as the out-of-court
information relative to the circumstances of the crime bears an indicia
of reliability, then the sentencing court can consider it without providing
the defendant with a right to confrontation.‖176 Yet the Eighth Circuit
gave this rationale in United States v. Wallace177 in 2005, a year after
the Court‘s decision in Crawford had outright rejected that substantive
reliability was the sole aim of the Confrontation Clause.178 Instead, the
Eighth Circuit upheld its own precedent in United States v. Due.179 The
Eighth Circuit devoted one line to rejecting the Confrontation Clause in
Due, and noted simply, ―[h]earsay is admissible at sentencing, if the
Court finds it reliable, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply.‖180
172. Id.
173. United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit relied
on Williams to draw this conclusion, but never makes clear why a case like Williams, decided on
due process grounds, would define ―accuser‖ for Sixth Amendment purposes. See id.
174. Id. However, the Court in Williams could not have applied the Confrontation Clause
because it was a New York state case and the Confrontation Clause had not yet been
incorporated to the states. See McGill, 140 P.3d at 948 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
175. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009). To be fair, Justice
Scalia also indicated that the drug analyst in Melendez-Diaz was an accuser because the analyst
was ―proving one fact necessary for his [defendant‘s] conviction.‖ Id. at 2533. One issue in the
confrontation right at sentencing debate may be whether Justice Scalia‘s analysis of two types of
witnesses continues to sentencing, and whether proving one fact necessary for a harsher or
perhaps capital sentencing is akin to proving a fact towards conviction.
176. United States v. Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046, 1048 (2005).
177. 408 F.3d 1046 (2005).
178. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
179. Wallace, 408 F.3d at 1048.
180. United States v. Due, 205 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000).
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In the absence of any rationale for such a broad conclusion, the Eighth
Circuit either linked its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause with
the reliability standard or determined that the sentencing phase is not a
part of ―all criminal prosecutions‖ under the Sixth Amendment. The
former rationale does not seem to withstand Crawford, but the notion
that sentencing is not part of all ―criminal prosecutions‖ may very well
be at the heart of the confrontation at sentencing debate.
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
may have said it best in United States v. Paull181 when it announced,
―We underscore that this cautious approach to a changing area of law is
the proper result of following our precedent. Crawford dealt only with
the content of what the Confrontation Clause requires and not the scope
of when it applies.‖182 In Paull, the defendant was convicted of
possession of child pornography pursuant to a plea agreement, and
appealed both his conviction and sentence.183 The Sixth Circuit briefly
rejected the petitioner‘s appeal on confrontation grounds, and while the
court acknowledged ―recent developments‖ in both sentencing and
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it held steadfast in its own
precedent in the absence of any direct Supreme Court guidance.184
Thus, the Sixth Circuit dubbed its approach to confrontation at
sentencing as the ―leaving Crawford‘s Confrontation Clause rule where
it is found‖ approach.185 The court reiterated that it simply followed suit
with all the circuits that have faced the issue, and all had ruled not to
apply the right to confrontation at noncapital sentencing.186 Whether or
not the Sixth Circuit‘s ruling will ultimately win the day, it is certainly
correct that in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, the most popular
approach is to not apply the Confrontation Clause during noncapital
sentencing at all.187

181. F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2009).
182. Id. at 528.
183. Id. at 519.
184. Id. at 527.
185. Id. at 528.
186. Id.
187. Id.; United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102, 109 (5th Cir. 2006) (―Crawford does not
extend a defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation Clause to sentencing proceedings.‖); United
States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005) (―Crawford does not extend to noncapital sentencing.‖); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005) (― [W]itnesses
providing information to the court after guilt is established are not accusers within the meaning
of the confrontation clause.‖); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005)
(―Nothing in Crawford requires us to alter our conclusion that there is no Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause right at sentencing.‖); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243 (2d
Cir. 2005) (holding that Crawford provides ―no basis to question prior Supreme Court decisions
that expressly approved the consideration of out-of-court statements at sentencing‖).
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III. DEATH IS DIFFERENT, EXCEPT WHEN IT ISN‘T: THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE AT CAPITAL SENTENCING
As united as the circuits may be on the issue of confrontation during
noncapital sentencing, there is at least a fracture forming among the
circuits as to whether the right of confrontation applies during capital
sentencing. In fact, in 2007 when the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit rejected a right of confrontation during capital
sentencing, overzealous legal bloggers frantically geared up for a
Supreme Court showdown,188 but after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in that case,189 the bloggers moved on to tackle more juicy
cases ripe for Supreme Court picking. While the majority of circuits
weighing in on the issue have continued to reject a right of
confrontation at capital sentencing, the issue is far from dead. The
reality of such a divide is that defendants maintain different
constitutional rights based solely on jurisdiction. More confusing still
may be why the same circuit rejecting a right of confrontation during
noncapital sentencing found a right of confrontation during capital
sentencing. Thus, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, death is
different (in some jurisdictions), except when it isn‘t (in others).
A. The Chosen Few: Circuit Courts Acknowledging a Right of
Confrontation at Capital Sentencing
1. Proffitt v. Wainwright: A Case Ahead of Its Time
―Because the death penalty, unlike other punishments, is permanent and
irrevocable, the procedures by which the decision to impose a capital
sentence is made bring into play constitutional limitations not present in
other sentencing decisions.‖190
Since Crawford landed on the scene in 2004, the Confrontation
Clause has definitely gained popularity among legal scholars, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted the
Confrontation Clause long before it was the legal trend. In fact, the year
was 1982, two decades before Crawford, and even then the Eleventh
Circuit in Proffitt v. Wainwright191 called the right of confrontation a
―procedural protection,‖ and indicated that the Supreme Court had not
yet determined the scope of such procedural protections awarded to
188. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Bid for Confrontation Right at Death Sentencing,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 12, 2007, 8:17 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/09/bid-forconfrontation-right-at-death-sentencing/; see also Fifth Circuit Rejects Application of Crawford
at Capital Sentencing, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Mar. 30, 2007, 7:56 AM),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2007/03/fifth_circuit_r.html.
189. United States v. Fields, 128 S. Ct. 1065 (2008) (denying petition).
190. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1253 (11th Cir. 1982).
191. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982).
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capital defendants during sentencing.192 By calling the Confrontation
Clause a ―procedural protection,‖193 the Wainwright court may well
have been ahead of its time. Racing even further ahead of its peers, the
Eleventh Circuit also held that the Confrontation Clause applies during
capital sentencing.194
In Wainwright, the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree
murder and recommended a sentence of death.195 After the jury
recommendation, the trial judge suggested that the defendant be
examined by two court-appointed psychiatrists prior to the final
sentencing determination.196 The doctors submitted reports to the
court.197 Over the defense attorney‘s request to cross-examine one of the
doctors who was unavailable, the judge admitted the doctor‘s report
without allowing the defendant to cross-examine the witness.198
While acknowledging that courts traditionally have not placed as
great a significance on the sentencing portion of a trial, the Wainwright
court placed great interest in Supreme Court decisions like Furman v.
Georgia199 and Gardner v. Florida,200 among other contemporary
Supreme Court cases that emphasized ―minimizing the risk of arbitrary
decisionmaking [sic].‖201 The cases examined by the Wainwright court
often focused on the Eighth Amendment, but the court generalized the
decisions as ensuring that a defendant had the opportunity to explain or
rebut evidence offered against him.202 Moreover, true to its post-Ohio
v. Roberts and pre-Crawford timeframe, the Wainwright court also
emphasized that ―[r]eliability in the factfinding aspect of sentencing has
192. Id. at 1253.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1254 (―Finally, we note . . . our conclusion that appellant had a constitutional
right to cross-examine Dr. Sprehe before the doctor‘s report could be used in determining
sentence.‖). Another case ahead of its time is a case from a state located in the Eleventh Circuit,
Rodriguez v. State. In that pre-Crawford case, the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned, ―The
primary interest secured by, and the major reason underlying the confrontation clause, is the
right of cross-examination. The right of confrontation protected by cross-examination is a right
that has been applied in the sentencing process.‖ Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 43–44 (Fla.
2000) (quoting Engle v. State, 438 So. 2d 803, 813–14 (Fla. 1983) (emphasis added)).
195. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1233.
196. Id. at 1250.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (―There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, from which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim was to forbid
arbitrary . . . penalties of a severe nature.‖).
200. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
201. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1253. Notably, this type of thinking is in line with the
Crawford Court rationale, which sought to interpret the Constitution in a way that minimized
judicial discretion. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
202. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1253.
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been a cornerstone of these decisions.‖203 The court thus held, ―The
Supreme Court‘s emphasis in . . . capital sentencing cases on the
reliability of the factfinding underlying the decision whether to impose
the death penalty convinces us that the right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings.‖204
Although at least part of the Wainwright court‘s rationale may be
outdated in a post-Crawford world, it is still good law in the Eleventh
Circuit, even after the same circuit held that the right of confrontation
does not apply in noncapital sentencing in United States v.
Cantellano.205 While the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged in Cantellano
the right of confrontation extends, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, to
capital sentencing, it provided little reasoning to answer why, in terms
of confrontation, death (capital sentencing) is different.206 In fact, the
Eleventh Circuit quoted a Supreme Court case discussing the
Confrontation Clause in a pretrial context and noted, ―[T]he right to
confrontation is a trial right.‖207 If this is the Eleventh Circuit‘s
rationale for noncapital sentencing, it is difficult to understand why a
capital sentencing hearing is a trial, while a noncapital sentencing
hearing is not.208
2. United States v. Mills: Because Death is Different
―Because the death penalty is uniquely different in its finality and
severity, increased scrutiny is required at every step of the capital
process to ensure that death is the appropriate penalty.‖209
United States v. Mills answered the question that the Eleventh
Circuit left open. At least to the Mills court, the punishment of death is
different.210 Mills has become something of a poster child for courts
later interpreting that a right of confrontation exists in some form of
sentencing.211 In Mills, a jury found two defendants guilty of a violent
203. Id. While reliability remains an important component of the Confrontation Clause
post-Crawford, Justice Scalia called for reliability ―assessed in a particular manner,‖ not
reliability as a substantive guarantee. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
204. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1254.
205. 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005).
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
208. Under this reasoning, capital sentencing would be more like a trial (thus deserving a
right to confrontation), while regular sentencing (even sentencing where life in prison is at
stake) is more like a pretrial hearing. It is difficult to understand why the gravity of punishment
would affect whether sentencing is more trial-like or more like a pretrial hearing.
209. United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
210. Id.
211. See Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, *8 (2011) (―We believe that the federal district
court‘s decision in United States v. Mills . . . to be more persuasive [than Williams v. New
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crime in aid of racketeering.212 The prosecution sought to introduce
hundred-page pre-sentencing and post-sentencing reports alleging
misconduct ―ranging in severity from delaying a bed count or flooding
one‘s cell to never-prosecuted acts of murder.‖213
The Mills court determined that the reports introduced during
sentencing contained some testimonial statements.214 It is worth noting
that the type of reports at issue in Mills are similar to reports that the
Supreme Court has ruled are among the ―core class of testimonial
statements,‖215 at least during the guilt-determination phase of the trial.
The Melendez-Diaz Court also further emphasized the importance of the
procedural ability to cross-examine a live witness‘s ―honesty,
proficiency, and methodology.‖216 It follows that such concerns should
be important even during the sentencing portion of a trial. Courts must
be concerned with the ability of a convicted defendant to confront a
witness, as in Mills, who alleges during sentencing that the defendant
committed such terrible and prejudicial crimes as unprosecuted murder.
The Mills court ultimately held that the Confrontation Clause
applies during both the selection phase217 and at least part of the
eligibility phase218 of capital sentencing and performed an extensive
analysis of the evolution of capital sentencing.219 The court recognized
that Williams v. New York has never been overturned, but made a
distinction between sentencing by a judge (as was the case in Williams)
and by jury, which is required under the Federal Death Penalty Act
(FDPA).220 The Mills court recognized steps the Supreme Court has
York].‖); see also United States v. Concepcion, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1221 (D. Colo. 2007) (―I
agree with Mills that under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause is applicable at both the
eligibility phase and at least a portion of the selection phase.‖).
212. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1136.
215. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (quoting White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (noting
affidavits ―are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony‖).
216. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538.
217. The selection phase is the phase where the jury determines whether a defendant
should receive the death penalty. See Mills, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
218. The eligibility phase is the phase in which a jury determines whether a defendant is
eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 1125.
219. Id. at 1131.
220. Id. at 1119–20, 1122–24. The FDPA sets the procedures in a capital trial in federal
court. Id. at 1119. The Act leaves to the jury the ultimate decision of whether to impose the
death penalty. Id. at 1119–20. The Mills court described the six-step procedure the FDPA
requires the jury to undertake,
(1) that the statutory intent factor has been proven beyond all reasonable doubt,
(2) that at least one statutory aggravating facto[r] [sic] has been established
beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) that any additional statutory factors have been
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taken in recent case law to protect the rights of convicted individuals
who may face the death penalty.221 For example, the Mills Court
reasoned that the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona222 held ―that a jury
must find, beyond all reasonable doubt, whatever facts are necessary to
satisfy the ‗eligibility‘ function of a capital sentencing scheme.‖223 The
court reasoned that while the Supreme Court in Ring did not resolve the
issue of confrontation at sentencing, the Court at least ―strongly
suggests‖ that the Confrontation Clause applies during the eligibility
phase of sentencing.224 The Mills Court reiterated the reasoning from
Ring, noting that a sentencing scheme like the one at issue in that
case—which required a finding of an aggravating factor beyond a
reasonable doubt before the defendant could qualify for capital
punishment—operated as a finding of an element of a greater offense.225
Thus, a sentencing scheme that requires a finding of an aggravating
factor to qualify for capital punishment is protected by the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury.226 The court‘s reasoning in Mills is sound
because a Sixth Amendment jury right only applies if this aspect of
sentencing is considered a ―criminal prosecution‖ for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment. Since the Supreme Court held that a jury right does
apply, it follows that the defendant would also have confrontation rights
guaranteed by the same Sixth Amendment, at least during the eligibility
phase of sentencing.227
established beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) that any non-statutory aggravating
factor has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, (5) whether any single
juror has found a mitigating factor by preponderance of the evidence, and (6)
―whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently
outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence
of death, or, in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggravating
factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of death.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also discussion infra Section IV.B.
221. Id. at 1124–28.
222. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the defendant was found guilty of felony-murder. Id. at
597. Under Arizona law, the maximum punishment for his conviction was life imprisonment. Id.
In addition, the defendant could only be sentenced to capital punishment if an aggravating factor
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. However, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment,
applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a jury, not a judge, make
the finding. Id.
223. Mills, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (noting also that the Court did not answer whether facts
found in the ―selection‖ function must be subject to a jury finding).
224. Id. at 1127–28. The Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona did reason, ―Because Arizona‘s
enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‗the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense‘ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.‘‖ Ring, 536 U.S. at 609
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)).
225. Mills, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
226. Id.
227. Notably, the debate is more complicated than such simple logic because the Court has
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B. The Refusal to Extend the Right of Confrontation to Capital
Sentencing
1. United States. v. Fields:228 Because Death is Not Different
―Neither the text of the Sixth Amendment nor the history of murder
trials supports the extension of the Confrontation Clause to testimony
relevant only to penalty selection in a capital case.‖229
The majority in United States v. Fields rejected that a right to
confrontation exists during capital sentencing.230 While the Fields court
acknowledged that Williams v. New York was decided on due process
rather than Sixth Amendment grounds, nearly the entire court‘s
rationale rested on Williams and the Supreme Court‘s decision not to
overturn Williams in Gardner v. Florida.231 The Fields court reasoned
that reports made by correctional officers, the defendant‘s mother,
juvenile probation officers, the police, and other witnesses were all
relevant in determining Field‘s past violent conduct and future
dangerousness.232 Ultimately the court was persuaded that the Court in
Williams ―was urged to ‗draw a constitutional distinction as to the
procedure for obtaining information where the death sentence is
imposed,‘ but it explicitly refused to do so.‖233 The Fields court also
placed significance in Williams dicta indicating the importance of
allowing a wide body of information during sentencing.234
This rationale from Fields is flawed for two reasons. First, the
Fields majority admits that Williams does not address the scope of a
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment rights during capital sentencing, but then
claims that the Williams Court had an opportunity to draw a line
concerning procedures during capital sentencing. While the Fields
majority is correct in saying the Williams Court had an opportunity to
decide capital sentencing procedures for due process purposes,
Crawford makes it clear that confrontation, for Sixth Amendment
purposes, is a procedural issue in its own right.235 Furthermore, the
Court, practicing judicial restraint, would not bring up a Sixth
chosen to separate Sixth Amendment rights, applying some of them during capital sentencing,
while choosing not to apply others. Douglass, supra note 16, at 1967. John G. Douglass‘s
argument that the Sixth Amendment should apply during the entire case would certainly
simplify the confrontation debate, as well as make textual sense in light of the way the Sixth
Amendment is constructed. See id. at 1972.
228. 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007).
229. Id. at 335.
230. Id. at 326–27.
231. Id. at 326–29.
232. Id. 324–25.
233. Id. at 326 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949)).
234. Id. at 327.
235. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
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Amendment issue not before it; nor could it since the Confrontation
Clause was not yet applicable to the states.236 Second, the Fields court is
also correct that the Court in Williams referenced the importance of
having a large body of information available at sentencing, but the
application of the Confrontation Clause does not serve to limit the
quantity of information—it only limits the manner in which the
information is to be presented.237
The Fields court also relied on the Seventh Circuit case United
States v. Roche to conclude that witnesses at sentencing are not accusers
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.238 However neither the
Fields majority nor the court in Roche provide much explanation as to
why witnesses testifying after guilt is established are not accusers under
the Sixth Amendment.239 The Roche court reasoned that the applicable
provision at sentencing is the Due Process Clause, not the Sixth
Amendment and pointed to Williams for support.240 The Fields court
appears to have accepted this rationale.241 However, clearly due process
concerns are not the only applicable constitutional considerations during
sentencing. After all, the Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay242 held that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies during sentencing
proceedings.243 Of course, the Due Process Clause makes the Sixth
Amendment applicable to the states.244 However, the Due Process
Clause cannot be the only constitutional provision relevant at
sentencing, particularly at the federal level where the Bill of Rights
apply without the aid of the Due Process Clause.

236. Notably, Williams v. New York was an appeal from a state case, where the
Confrontation Clause did not yet apply. The decision to apply the Confrontation Clause to the
states did not occur until sixteen years later. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)
(applying the Confrontation Clause to the states).
237. Fields, 483 F.3d at 374 (Benavides, J., dissenting) (―[I]t is far from clear that applying
the Confrontation Clause would result in ‗less evidence.‘‖).
238. Id. at 328.
239. Id.; United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005).
240. Roche, 415 F.3d at 618.
241. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 328.
242. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
243. Id. at 134–36.
244. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
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The Fields majority also reasoned that Gardner v. Florida245 was
not a ―Williams-killer,‖ for two reasons.246 First, the Fields court
reasoned that since Gardner was also based on the Due Process Clause,
and since it also made no mention of the Confrontation Clause, it further
proves that the Williams due process analysis is controlling for
sentencing questions, even though Williams was decided preincorporation.247 Second, Gardner did not overrule Williams, and thus,
the Williams holding that due process does not prevent a judge from
admitting out-of-court statements in sentencing proceedings is
controlling.248 Ultimately, the Fields court determined that, when it
comes to a right of confrontation during capital sentencing, the Supreme
Court‘s ―death is different‖ jurisprudence is superseded by the ultimate
precedent of Williams v. New York and nothing, not even death, can
change the relevance of that case.249
2. Far From Clear: Other Federal Courts, Their Holdings or Lack
Thereof
―It is far from clear that the Confrontation Clause applies to a capital
sentencing proceeding.‖250
Three other federal cases have attempted to address the right of
confrontation at sentencing, but their holdings and rationales remain far
from clear. In United States v. Johnson251 the Northern District of Iowa
in the Eighth Circuit indicated that there is no right of confrontation
during sentencing, noting that the appellant had ―not convinced the
court that the Confrontation Clause also applies in the final phase of
these trifurcated proceedings . . . .‖252 However, oddly, the court went
245. The Court in Gardner did note that, ―it is now clear that the sentencing process, as
well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.‖ Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). However, it is unclear why the Court would have brought up
the Confrontation Clause on its own accord, as the court in Fields suggests it would have done
were a right to exist. Fields, 483 F.3d at 329 (―Asked to examine what rights defendants have
under the Due Process Clause with regard to the presentation of evidence at Capital sentencing,
the Court . . . made no mention of the right of confrontation . . . .‖). Yet the Court in Gardner
was asked only to examine rights under the Due Process Clause, not the Sixth Amendment. The
Court in Gardner did acknowledge, however, that, ―five Members of the Court have now
expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be
imposed in this country.‖ Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357.
246. Fields, 483 F.3d at 329.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 331.
250. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003).
251. 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
252. Id. at 1062. The trifurcated proceedings in the case consisted of a merit phase, to
determine guilt or innocence of the defendant, an eligibility phase, to determine whether the
defendant was eligible for the death penalty, and finally, the penalty phase to determine the
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on to conclude that even if the Confrontation Clause applied during the
penalty phase of capital sentencing, the testimony at issue did not
violate the Confrontation Clause.253 Why the court addressed the
constitutionality of the Confrontation Clause in the first place is
confusing if the testimony at issue was not subject to Sixth Amendment
protections, anyway.
In Szabo v. Walls,254 a 2002 case, the Seventh Circuit was clearer
when holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply during
capital sentencing.255 The Seventh Circuit insisted that, ―the Supreme
Court has held that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to capital
sentencing.‖256 Of course, its support for this statement was Williams v.
New York, a pre-incorporation case, and a pre-Crawford decision,
decided on due process grounds.257 Thus, it is far from clear that this
rationale would withstand close scrutiny.
Finally, in United States v. Higgs,258 decided a year before
Crawford, the Fourth Circuit essentially reasoned that it did not need to
reach a conclusion on the confrontation at sentencing issue because the
issue was not raised in the lower court.259 Thus, the court was only
reviewing the decision for plain error.260 The appellant, who argued that
allowing a police officer to testify about a co-defendant‘s confession
violated his right of confrontation, had to prove that error occurred, that
the error was plain, and that it affected a substantial right.261 Thus, the
Higgs court held ―[E]ven if the introduction of Haynes‘s
statements . . . during the sentencing proceeding was error, we cannot
say that the error was plain since it even remains unclear whether the
Confrontation Clause applies in this circumstance.‖262 Thus, the
Confrontation Clause dilemmas contemplated and left unanswered by
the Fourth Circuit in 2003 are the same as those that are still being
pondered by courts in 2012. Whether a right of confrontation exists
during capital sentencing is simply unclear.

aggravating and mitigating factors and whether to impose a death sentence. Id. at 1055.
253. Id. at 1062.
254. 313 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2002).
255. Id. at 398.
256. Id.
257. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949) (―The sentencing judge may
consider such information even though obtained outside the courtroom from persons whom a
defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-examine.‖). However, the term
―Confrontation Clause‖ does not appear on any page of the opinion. See generally id.
258. 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003).
259. Id. at 324.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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IV. THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: TEXTUALISM, HISTORY, AND A
DEPARTURE FROM WILLIAMS
Courts addressing the issue of a right of confrontation during
sentencing are somewhat misguided for three reasons. The courts fail to
listen to the guidance set forth in Crawford that the Court has
steadfastly followed in both Crawford and its offspring. That is, courts
have largely ignored both history and textualism.263 Courts have also
grasped for precedent where none exists. The Supreme Court has never
explicitly decided whether a right of confrontation exists at any time or
at any stage of sentencing.264 The road less traveled, that is a textual and
historical approach, may provide the best answer to the applicability of
the Confrontation Clause at sentencing debate, but absent a Supreme
Court opinion, it all remains just speculation.
A. A Textual Approach with a Historical Answer
―The issue before us, therefore, is whether the penalty phase of a capital
sentencing proceeding is part of a criminal prosecution. As a matter of
pure logic and textualism, it is difficult to characterize the penalty phase
as anything other than part of a criminal prosecution.‖265
In light of the Supreme Court‘s ―fragmented‖ application of the
Sixth Amendment during sentencing, textualism alone is unlikely to
divulge the full answer to the confrontation puzzle.266 However, Justice
Scalia‘s use of an 1828 dictionary to define both witness267 and
testimony in Crawford268 at least point toward a textualist approach.
When determining WWFD?, one may not necessarily need to invent a
time machine; the clues to the answer may rest instead within the binds
of a simple dictionary. After all, the text of the Sixth Amendment is not
explicitly broken into sections, with some rights applying to a criminal
prosecution and others not. Instead, the Sixth Amendment reads, ―In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy . . .‖ each right granted
by the Sixth Amendment.269
The same 1828 dictionary used in Crawford defines ―prosecution‖
as, ―The institution and carrying on of a suit in a court of law or equity
to obtain some right, or to redress and punish some wrong.‖270 The
263. Notably, the court in Fields partially relied on a historical and textual rationale but
reached a different conclusion. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 335 (5th Cir. 2007).
264. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 1976.
265. State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 947 (Ariz. 2006) (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
266. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 1974.
267. A witness is one who ―bear[s] testimony.‖ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51
(2004).
268. Id.
269. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
270. Prosecution Definition, WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY, http://www.1828-
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second definition of ―prosecution‖ is, ―The institution or
commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of
exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal,
and pursuing them to final judgment.‖271 An 1860 Legal Dictionary
defines prosecution as, ―The means adopted to bring a supposed
offender to justice and punishment by due course of law.‖272 Further, an
accuser is ―one who accuses; one who brings a charge of crime or
fault.‖273
Such definitions, taken alone, cannot answer the question of whether
a right of confrontation should apply during sentencing, or at the very
least during capital sentencing. However, these definitions are strong
evidence to support the intent of the Framers. After all, as Justice Scalia
has suggested, ―[W]e are guided by the principle that ‗[t]he Constitution
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.‘‖274 Each of the definitions of ―prosecution‖ above indicate in
some way that sentencing is part of a criminal prosecution, and each
definition sheds light on what an ordinary voter at the time of the
Framers would have understood as the meaning of a criminal
prosecution. Thus, these definitions further the notion that the
Confrontation Clause should apply during sentencing, or at least during
capital sentencing.
Importantly, such definitions must be taken together with history to
truly provide a possible answer to the confrontation during sentencing
debate. These definitions seem to indicate that punishment is part of a
criminal prosecution, but what does history suggest? The Crawford
Court pointed to State v. Campbell,275 an 1844 South Carolina case, to
help interpret the right of confrontation.276 The Campbell court held that
a coroner‘s signed deposition could not be admitted against the
defendant because the witness was unavailable for cross-examination at
trial and had not been cross-examined when the report was taken.277 The
court noted:

dictionary.com/d/search/word,Prosecution (emphasis added).
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY VOLUME II 396 (1860) (emphasis added).
273. Accuser Definition, WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY, http://www.1828dictionary.com/d/search/word,Accuser (emphasis added). Some courts like the Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Roche outright declare that witnesses during sentencing are not accusers
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, without using either a textual or historical
approach. Cf. United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005).
274. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008).
275. 30 S.C.L. 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844).
276. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004).
277. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. at 131.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/10

32

Harris: Surpassing Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontat

2012]

NEXT STEP IN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

1479

I cannot conceive how judges could have resolved, that the
depositions of deceased witnesses, when examined by the
coroner, should be received as competent evidence at the
final trial of life and death- but by assuming that the
written testimony had been taken under all the guards and
tests of the common law, and especially those of the crossexamination.278
The language ―final trial of life and death‖279 from the Campbell
opinion indicates that Campbell‘s trial was a capital case, and true to the
era, the death penalty was likely ―the exclusive and mandatory
sentence.‖280 Thus, reviewing the historical context in which the
Confrontation Clause was applied in Campbell, taken together with a
textual meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the historical answer to
the confrontation question is that the Framers and citizens would have
assumed that the right of confrontation exists both for guilt
determination and sentencing. This is because guilt and sentencing were
usually one in the same, and for specified offenses, that punishment was
death.281
This ―sanction-specific‖ type of punishment, especially as it relates
to capital punishment, is relevant because it reinforces the idea that the
people in the Framers‘ world simply would not have understood the
bifurcated system with separate trial and sentencing rights that exists in
today‘s world.282 Taking these historical definitions of criminal
prosecution and accuser, together with the Crawford definition of
testimony, 283 two inferences can be made. One, an accuser who gave
testimony in a criminal prosecution during the time of the Framers was
one who gave information, to prove some fact, and to help establish
some crime or fault of the defendant, for the ultimate goal of convicting,
and punishing the defendant. Two, if the crime in question was murder,
treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or sodomy,284 the accuser
was giving information about the defendant for purposes of imposing
capital punishment. Thus, particularly with the regard to the death
penalty, the right of confrontation protected the defendant from an
accuser who was not only seeking to help achieve a conviction, but also
a punishment of death. In the words of the Campbell court, ―[O]ne of
the indispensable conditions of such due course of law is, that
278. Id. (emphasis added).
279. Id.
280. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).
281. Id.
282. See Douglass, supra note 16, at 2011.
283. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (noting that testimony is a ―solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact‖).
284. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 289.
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prosecutions be carried on to the conviction of the accused, by
witnesses confronted by him [the defendant], and subjected to his
personal examination.‖285 If, under Crawford, the Confrontation Clause
is truly to be interpreted ―by the expectation of the Framers at the time
the Sixth Amendment was adopted in 1791,‖286 then both text and
history suggest that some sort of confrontation right exists during at
least capital sentencing, if not beyond.
B. Grasping for Precedent: The Questionable Historical Approach and
Applicability of Williams v. New York to Confrontation at Sentencing
―Williams‘s notion of unchecked judicial discretion in capital
sentencing would have been foreign—and, I believe, downright
frightening—to the Framers.‖287
Since many courts choosing not to apply the Confrontation Clause
during sentencing have done so, at least in part, in reliance on Williams
v. New York, it is worth understanding why such reliance may be
questionable in light of the historical approach in Crawford and the
grounds on which Williams was originally decided.
The Williams Court recognized that the death penalty was an
―automatic and commonplace result of conviction[]‖ in early America,
but maintained that sentencing judges had much discretion.288 This begs
the question, discretion as to what? If capital punishment was automatic
in early America, then judges could not have had discretion over what
evidence was permitted when considering sentencing because
sentencing was determined by the crime, not the multitude of factors
considered by modern courts. This is a question that the Supreme Court
must address: do judges maintain discretion during sentencing? If so,
what protections does a defendant have in those situations? The history
and the text of the Sixth Amendment provide little help in the way of
answering these questions, particularly in light of capital sentencing.
One indicator may be Justice Scalia‘s emphasis on the procedural
protection of confrontation and its ability to limit judicial discretion.289
Another may be his indication that prior to Crawford, there was a
failure to interpret the Constitution in a manner that achieves constraint
on judicial discretion.290 However it is unclear whether Justice Scalia
and the rest of the Court would also advocate interpreting the Sixth
Amendment to constrain judicial discretion during sentencing.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124, 125 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844) (emphasis added).
State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 949 (Ark. 2006).
Douglass, supra note 16, at 2021.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 247 (1949).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
Id.
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Additionally, the Court in Williams recognized that modern courts
were trending towards individualized sentencing,291 which is consistent
with a modern bifurcated system. However, under New York law at the
time Williams was decided, first-degree murder was punishable by
death, ―unless the jury recommend[ed] life imprisonment.‖292 This type
of sentencing was somewhat individualized in that it gave the jury
discretion to recommend a departure and the judge the ability to make
the ultimate decision. However, the similarity of Williams to the
situation in early America is that the jury convicted and recommended a
life sentence for the defendant based only on information provided at
trial.293 In fact, the reports later viewed by the judge in Williams were
not admissible at trial.294 If Williams had been decided in today‘s
jurisprudence, that is post-incorporation, the information at trial would
have been subject to all the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Only
after the jury conviction and sentence recommendation, did the judge
look at reports, not subject to the Confrontation Clause, submitted to
him under New York law.295 Thus, under this rationale, it is easy to
understand why courts like the Arkansas Supreme Court in Vankirk,
chose to draw a line between judge and jury; at the very most Williams
stands for the idea that there is no right of confrontation during judge
sentencing, not jury sentencing.
Looking at Williams more narrowly, it is also quite plausible that
―Williams is simply a case setting forth the minimum requirements of
Fourteenth Amendment due process with respect to the use of hearsay
testimony.‖296 After all, as previously noted, Williams could not have
been decided on Confrontation Clause grounds because that Sixth
Amendment right did not apply to the states at the time Williams was
decided.297 Furthermore, Williams must be understood in light of
Crawford and post-Crawford decisions. Due process under Williams
may require a certain degree of substantive reliability, but Crawford
291. Williams, 337 U.S. at 248
292. Id. at 242 n.2.
293. Id. at 243 (―The judge instructed the jury that if it returned a verdict of guilty as
charged, without recommendation for life sentence, ‗The Court must impose the death penalty,‘
but if such recommendation was made, ‗the Court may impose a life sentence.‘‖). At the time
the Constitution was drafted the decision as to whether a defendant should be put to death was
also made solely on the basis of evidence introduced during the course of the trial. State v.
McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 950 (Ariz. 2006).
294. Williams, 337 U.S. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (― [I]n a capital case, against the
unanimous recommendation of a jury, where the report would concededly not have been
admissible at the trial, and was not subject to examination by the defendant, I am forced to
conclude that the high commands of due process were not obeyed.‖).
295. Id. at 244.
296. State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 948 (Ariz. 2006).
297. Pointer v. Texas was decided in 1965 and made the Confrontation Clause applicable
to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
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requires procedural reliability.298 Thus, Williams only addressed
substantive due process reliability of evidence at sentencing, not the
procedural Confrontation Clause method of achieving reliability
through cross-examination. In the absence of Supreme Court guidance,
courts will continue to grasp for precedent, using Williams as a shield to
protect a decision not to apply the Confrontation Clause at sentencing.
With defendants having different protections during sentencing from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from capital to noncapital sentencing, the
Supreme Court must draw a line. That line must be drawn with an eye
towards history and text, and not based on a case that lacks relevance to
the issue at hand.
CONCLUSION: THE LOGICAL NEXT STEP
―The Supreme Court has recognized cross-examination as ‗the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth.‘‖299
As discussed briefly in Subsection II.A.2,300 the Court‘s recent
decisions in Apprendi, Blakely, and Crawford point toward the next
logical next step: that the right of confrontation should apply during
sentencing. Each of these three decisions was based, in part, on
historical grounds, with an eye toward how voters during the Framers‘
time would have understood Sixth Amendment protections. In
Apprendi, the Court addressed the historical relevance of a trial by jury,
and the importance of determining ―the truth of every accusation.‖301
Blakely reinforced that, ―every defendant has the right to insist that the
prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the
punishment.‖302 Finally, Crawford resurrected the Confrontation Clause
from its former convolution in hearsay and substantive reliability. These
cases, taken together,303 emphasize two key points. First, these cases
emphasize protecting a defendant throughout the course of trial and
sentencing. Second, they do so on the basis of history. Thus, a logical
extension of both defendant protection and history may very well be
that the Confrontation Clause must apply during at least capital
sentencing, if not parts of noncapital sentencing more generally.
More importantly, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance,
defendants have varying abilities to confront witnesses during
sentencing hearings from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. With such lofty
298. See McGill, 140 P.3d at 948.
299. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
300. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2.
301. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
302. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
303. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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decisions as life or death, and varying degrees of prison terms at stake,
it is crucial that the Court make a final interpretation on whether the
right of confrontation applies during sentencing. Until the Confrontation
Clause surpasses the sentencing barrier, the confrontation at sentencing
debate remains the logical next step in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.
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